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ABSTRACT
Using data on 32 actors and ties among them drawn from avail-
able court files, we combine analytical sociology with statistical
models for networks in order to analyse a case of a counterfeit
alcohol distribution network from the Czech Republic. We formu-
late a theory of action and identify relational mechanisms which
could explain how the structure of the network emerged and
describe. We use the exponential random graph model to test
these mechanisms. The analysis reveals that the two actors cap-
able of manufacturing the poisonous mixture were considerably
though not optimally proximate to others enabling fast distribu-
tion of the mixture. Our model results that the structure was
formed by mechanisms of triadic closure, negative tendency to
concentrate ties, and tie translation of pre-existing ties into opera-
tional ties. We conclude with the discussion of the implications our
approach for the study of criminal networks.
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In recent years, social network analysis (SNA).1 has become popular among criminolo-
gists, who apply it to different types of organised crime, ranging from gangs, smuggling
and trafficking of illegal commodities, political corruption, to terrorism.2
Studies about trafficking and smuggling of illegal commodities have aimed to unravel
the overall network structures. In comparison to co-offending networks and also to their
legal counterparts, these networks tend to exhibit a lower numbers of ties (density) and
lower concentration of ties around key actors (centralisation). Moreover, these networks
also reveal stronger centralisation than terrorist networks.3 For instance, Natarajan4
found that the network of heroin distribution in New York City was composed of
small compact groups which were loosely interconnected. There is also evidence that
drug trafficking networks may be evolving over time in response to supply/demand, and
to the activity of law enforcement agents.5 Hughes, Bright, and Chalmers6 map the
functional and structural differentiation of poly-drug distribution networks operating
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simultaneously with multiple types of drugs. This differentiation may take different
forms, such as outsourcing production to another drug syndicate, accompanied by the
emergence of clear management structures with centralised oversight. A study by Lord
and colleagues7 on a counterfeit alcohol distribution found that the network was
considerably resilient and adaptive due to a number of brokers who managed and
oversaw the processes associated with production and distribution.
Despite the wide application of SNA, it has been criticised, particularly for two issues.
First, network research on organised crime often lacks proper theoretical foundations,8
being driven by available data rather than by theory.9 Second, research on criminal
networks strongly relies on descriptive measures, neglecting complex interdependencies
among actors and ties and more in-depth explanations of criminal network structures.10
This paper aims to overcome both issues by using the theoretical approach of
analytical sociology11 and analytical criminology12 in combination with statistical
models developed for network data.13 The analytical approach is based on identifying
micro-level mechanisms which result in outcomes at the macro level. Specifically, we
aim to identify relational mechanisms that bring about the observed network struc-
ture. Statistical models for social networks synergize with this aim, as they allow to
disentangle the network structure into micro-elements representing relational
mechanisms. There are several examples of previous studies of criminal networks
using mechanism-oriented theory and statistical models for networks.14 We build
upon this work by explicitly formulating a theory of action for criminal networks
and deriving hypotheses on relational mechanisms. Subsequently, we test the
hypotheses with a statistical network model. This way, we deduce explanations
from the theory of action first and then compare them with the model results to
see if there is empirical support for them or not.
We study a case of a counterfeit alcohol distribution network from the Czech Republic
which has become publicly known as the methanol affair. This network was uncovered
in the second half of 2012 after its activities resulted in numerous cases of deaths and
permanent medical consequences for tens of victims due to drinking methanol-diluted
spirits. The poisonous mixture had been efficiently distributed to a lot of consumers
across the whole country in a process of cooperation and coordination among actors
who manufactured, distributed, and sold it. We aim to shed more light on this specific
case combining a general theoretical and rigorous methodological framework.
Background of the case: the methanol affair
The case studied in this paper is a network of actors involved in the production and
distribution of illegal alcoholic beverages mixed with poisonous methanol. In
September 2012, this affair was under widespread attention from police and media in
the Czech Republic when series of deaths and serious health damages, most promi-
nently poisoning induced blindness, occurred after consuming a poisonous mix of
alcoholic beverages with methanol. In the aftermath, around 140 people suffered health
damage and more than fifty died. Because of the rapid outbreak and increase in the
number of victims, Czech state officials decided to impose temporary prohibition across
the whole Czech Republic and temporary restrictions on alcohol export from the Czech
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Republic. These restrictions together with tax evasions associated with production and
distribution of untaxed spirits resulted in strongly negative economic consequences.
During the investigation, it became apparent that the whole affair can be divided into
two branches. The first one was based in the Zlín region in the eastern part of the Czech
Republic and consisted of a long-term active organised criminal group led by RB, an
entrepreneur and local éminence grise. This group developed an organised division of
labour, provided a cover for illicit activities with legal business, and some of the actors
routinely used intimidation, coercion, or physical confrontation in order to protect their
illegal profits. These profits were mostly coming from tax evasion via production and
distribution of untaxed alcoholic beverages. The second branch was located around the
city of Ostrava and revolved around manufacturing and distribution of the incriminated
lethal mix of alcohol and methanol. This mixture was originally created by a pair of
actors, TK and RF, from whom it was distributed by JV, previously a legal distributor of
spirits. The actors involved collaborated on the mixing of the poisonous drinks, storage,
and distribution to small convenience stores or to potential customers directly.
Analytical sociology and network mechanisms
In this study we build upon analytical sociology.15 The three pillars of this approach are
mechanism-based explanations, the micro-macro link, and a theory of action. Regarding
the first pillar, analytical sociology seeks to identify micro-level social mechanisms by
identifying a constellation of entities and activities, typically actors and their actions, that
are linked in such a way that they regularly bring about the phenomenon under study.16
This approach can be fruitful for SNA which concerns actors and relations among them.
In SNA, the mechanisms of interest are the relational mechanisms connected to pattern-
ing ties in networks.17 These mechanisms reflect tendencies of actors to act in the
network in certain ways by creating, maintaining, or dissolving ties. However, actors in
the network are seldom able to oversee the entire structure of the network as their
information radius is limited mostly to their personal network, that is, the other actors to
whom they are directly connected, with some further information about the connections
of their connections. Hence, the macro-level network structure arises as a consequence
of the accumulation, overlap, and collision of individual actions via relational
mechanisms.18 This is the core of the second pillar of analytical sociology – explaining
how macro outcomes are brought about by their micro foundations.
The analytical distinction between micro-relational mechanisms and macro-level out-
comes is crucial here, as a particular characteristic of the whole network (a macro
outcome), such as centralisation, is not necessarily the consequence of one relational
mechanism of concentration of ties because multiple mechanisms operate simulta-
neously either reinforcing or cancelling each other out.19 A strong centralisation of
a drug distribution network might suggest that the central actors mobilised resources
and efforts into organising and coordinating this network. However, this explanation
may be incorrect if we also consider another mechanism such as triadic closure, in which
three actors all become directly connected to each other. Hence, the centralisation of
the network might have arisen as an unintended consequence of creating closed triads
which incidentally overlap due to the inclusion of particular individuals, making them in
turn central. A descriptive analysis of the network does not allow to untangle these
GLOBAL CRIME 53
competing mechanisms. Therefore, it is necessary to use suitable statistical models for
social networks to separate the contribution of several relational mechanisms to the
structure.20 Such statistical network models employ computer simulations to effectuate
the micro-macro link.
Theory of action
The third pillar of analytical sociology is a theory of action.21 The theory of action
specifies motives, constraints, and capabilities of actors, that is what happens at the
micro level. For our case, we need to clarify our assumptions on how actors will act (i.e.,
create, maintain or dissolve ties) in certain ways (representing relational mechanisms).
We assume that actors act purposefully in order to reach their goals.22 The primary goal
here is to make financial profit. In this illegal spirit distribution network, it is reasonable
to assume, which is further supported by the court testimonies of the offenders
themselves, that the actors attempted to reach financial profit by the sub-goal of
decreasing the cost of production through mixing alcohol with cheaper methanol and,
subsequently, selling the beverages to consumers.
However, this goal is accompanied by an additional sub-goal, which constitutes
a definitional feature of criminal networks, namely, the aim of actors to avoid detection
and remain concealed.23 In general, creating and maintaining ties is costly as actors need
to mobilise resources, such as time or cognitive capacity.24 The additional constraint of
trying to avoid detection in criminal networks places ‘extra costs’ on ties as each tie in
a criminal network increases visibility and thereby comes with a larger probability of being
detected. This is the most important imperative of actors in criminal networks; subject to
this constraint, they try to achieve the goals they had for joining the network.
The tension between both goals is captured in the efficiency/security trade-off.25 This
trade-off refers to the fact that the more the network is efficiently structured towards
reaching its goals by having numerous ties, the less it is secure because of the increased
visibility introduced by the increasing amount of ties. Conversely, the more securely the
network is structured, the less efficient it is in reaching its goals. This conflict between
efficiently reaching the illicit goal while maintaining security introduces tension into
individual action. Whenever there would be a conflict between remaining concealed and
generating profit, we assume actors would prefer security. The argument for this claim is
that the violation of security would lead to the inability to pursue any financial profit as
being arrested actors cannot manufacture and distribute illicit alcohol in the market.
Network as a channel for flows
The network of the methanol affair raised public and law enforcement attention because
of how quickly the poisonous beverages spread and killed or injured considerable
numbers of victims. How is it possible that a network of 32 actors, with only one pair
of them capable of manufacturing the mixture, was so deadly? Networks have been
regarded as channels for flows of various types of resources.26 From this point of view,
one question is how the individual actors contributed to the distribution of poisonous
spirits based on their position within the network and within the distribution flow.
A major aspect of network position is actor centrality27 – the more central actors are,
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the more influential they are for the distribution. This does not necessarily overlap with
the actors’ position within the distribution chain, where the importance of actors is
based on how close they are to the pair of manufacturers. The closer actors are to the
manufacturers the sooner they may profit from selling a batch of poisonous spirits either
to other involved actors or directly to consumers.
Next to individual actors, who can be assessed in terms of their contribution to flows
in the network, the structure of the network as a whole can also be characterised in
similar way. The longer path a batch of bottles has to travel in order to reach
a consumer, the more time it takes and the more expensive it is and likely to be
uncovered. Thus, an ideal distribution network from this point of view would have the
shortest possible paths from the manufacturers to the remaining actors, which implies
that the pair of manufacturers would have direct ties to all the other actors. In terms of
the efficiency/security trade-off, this would maximise the efficiency, but it would max-
imise the vulnerability at the same time. The two manufacturers might have had some
naïve conception of this, when they started to look for others to distribute the mixture.
The question here is to what extent the observed network of this case optimised the
closeness of the manufacturers to their co-offenders, enabling the quick distribution of
the potentially lethal mixture. We subsequently aim to test which relational mechanisms
can explain this overall network structure.
Structure of criminal networks
The structure of the network may arise from endogenous structural mechanisms,
independent of any other exogenous factors, reflecting a process of network self-
organisation. This simply means that creation or dissolution of ties depends on the
existence and/or absence of other ties in the network.28 The term ‘flexible order’ has
been used in criminal networks with a similar meaning, denoting the proposition that
there is no need for an architecture or plan for criminal network structure; rather, it
emerges from interactions and relations among members of the network.29 The most
fundamental structural endogenous mechanisms are preferential attachment, closure,
and brokerage. While these mechanisms are general, we argue how they might have
specifically influenced our case.
Preferential attachment describes how initial differences between actors in their num-
bers of ties cumulate over time to produce a highly skewed degree distribution with a few
highly central actors and a lot of marginal ones.30 According to this mechanism, the initial
number of ties triggers a cumulative self-reinforcing process, where the probability that an
actor creates/receives a new tie depends on the number of ties actors have – the more ties
an actor has, the more likely new ties will be made to this actor in the future, which in turn
increases the probability of having evenmore ties. This accumulation happens when having
many ties increases visibility to other members, or potential members in the network, and
also when it signifies power or a lucrative position.
In criminal networks, however, accumulation of ties has a clear disadvantage as each tie
also increases the risk of visibility of the actor to law enforcers, thus undermining the aim of
remaining concealed. In other words, while preferential attachment may increase efficiency,
it decreases security. While the profit returns from every new tie may diminish rapidly, the
chance of exposuremay actually grow faster with each new tie, and the costs ofmaintaining
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ties in terms of time or effort are more or less constant. The literature on strategic position-
ing in criminal networks suggests that actors in criminal networks actively restrict their
direct ties in order to avoid detection.31 Furthermore, actors joining the network may not
even be aware of who is the central actor, as they would need to see the whole network in
order to fully assess this, which is a doubtful assumption in covert settings.
Hypothesis 1: Actors display tendencies against preferential attachment.
Closure is a tendency of actors to close open micro-structures or, in friendship terms, to
befriend the friends of current friends. Closure is manifested in the network by the
presence of triangles, that is, triads in which all ties are present. The creation of closed
triangles is associated with increased social control, trust, and cooperation, because
actors embedded within closed structures can oversee one another, control and support
each other, and easily coordinate their efforts.32 All these effects strengthen the security
of the network as they help to prevent defection and infiltration. These advantages of
closed micro-structures may be a reason why actors display positive tendencies towards
closure, despite the fact that the proliferation of ties makes the network as a whole more
susceptible to detection due to increased visibility. However, actors themselves may not
be aware of macro structural consequences of strong closure as that would require them
to have a ‘bird’s eye view’ over the entire network and mutually coordinate ties in some
network-optimal way. But even in organisations with clearly defined formal organisa-
tional structures, parallel networks of informal ties emerge which may sometimes greatly
differ from the officially prescribed structures.33 Hence, a much more realistic assump-
tion about actors is that they try to improve their position within their network
neighbourhood by forming ties in a way they see as sufficient to achieve their goals.34
Because the advantages of closure at the micro-level are directly experienced by actors
rather than the disadvantages at the macro-level and they add to the security of the
network by fostering trust and social support while enabling cooperation (and thus
efficiency), we expect positive closure tendencies.
Hypothesis 2: Actors display tendencies towards closure.
Closure in a network with a given density is highest for networks composed of small
densely connected clusters of actors that are not interconnected. For interconnecting
these subgroups and limiting the extent of closure, the mechanism of brokerage may be
important, as it is the tendency of actors to bridge between closed regions.35 Brokerage
thus allows unimpeded flows in the network and it also provides the brokers with
a competitive advantage, which has been repeatedly documented in networks legal as
well as criminal. The reason is that whatever flows in the network needs to pass through
the broker in order to get from one part of the network to another.36 It is certainly possible
to imagine the inclination towards brokerage in the counterfeit alcohol distribution net-
work, because this would enable the generation of profit, which undoubtedly is of interest
in profit-oriented organised crime. Nevertheless, such profit serves mainly the broker and
not the brokered actors. Moreover, it does not necessarily translate into the profit of the
whole group. The arguments for brokerage assume an opposition between the aim of the
individual and those of the group, potentially leading to free-riding, decreased control,
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and defection, which would violate the security of the group. Substantial free-riding or
defection were arguably not viable alternatives for actors involved in this case, as they
were not able to produce nor distribute any larger amount of counterfeit alcohol on their
own; also many of them were embedded in the network by being tied to other actors not
only in terms of the illicit activities in the methanol affair, but also by being legitimate
business partners or employers/employees. For these reasons, we would not expect
a tendency for brokerage among actors in the network.
Hypothesis 3: Actors display tendencies against brokerage.
Individual attributes of actors in criminal networks
In addition to considering endogenous relational mechanisms, it is also necessary to
account for individual attributes of actors involved in this type of network, because attri-
butes reflect differences between actors in their abilities to contribute to reaching their
goals and the collective goal, which will influence which ties they create.37 Specifically, for
a case of illegalmanufacturing and distribution of alcohol, tie formationmight be influenced
by previous experiences of actors in legitimate business with spirits. There is a theoretical
stream in the literature which points out the similarities between organised crime and
legitimate organisations such as firms.38 In this light, such experience with legitimate
organisations and skills acquired therein may be useful for criminal activity.
This projection of business experience and corresponding skills and resources into
criminal activity may happen through two relational mechanisms – generalised social
selection and homophily. generalised social selection designates a situation in which
actors who possess certain attributes display the tendency to acquire certain network
positions, such as being central or peripheral.39 Actors with strategic skills and resources
may be important for the successful operation of the whole network thanks to which
they may hold specific positions in its structure.40 In this case, it is possible that
resources and know-how gained in entrepreneurship may predispose their bearers to
more central positions. A case in point may be the ability to manage employees,
translated into managing co-offenders in a criminal network. Furthermore, actors with
an entrepreneurial background may be more economic in the way they profit from their
ties, as success in legitimate business requires good micromanagement of one’s ties.
Thus, the returns from ties in criminal networks may be less diminishing for entrepre-
neurs than for actors without this background. Hence, we would expect the entrepre-
neurs to be more active in the network.
Hypothesis 4: Entrepreneurs tend to be more active.
Another mechanism based on attributes is homophily,41 which has been consistently
shown to be a powerful driving force in many different empirical contexts, including
criminal networks such as gangs.42 Homophily is frequently expressed with the saying
that ‘birds of a feather flock together’ as it is a tendency of actors to form ties to those
who are alike themselves – in other words, to those who share the same attribute. In
organised crime and in crime in general, it is possible to make a case for an inverse
mechanism to homophily: heterophily, the preference for choosing partners different
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from oneself in certain respects. The shortcoming of homophily is that mutually similar
partners may frequently share the same resources and information, but contacts and ties
to different others may also enable access to new resources and new information.43 This
is particularly beneficial for collaboration networks where differences may be mutually
complementary.44 The overreliance on similar alters decreases efficiency, as access to
unavailable resources, knowledge and skills. This works for both entrepreneurs and non-
entrepreneurs. Whereas entrepreneurs may need actors with certain skills, such as
operating machines or reliable drivers, to execute the production and distribution of
illegal alcohol, non-entrepreneurs may rely on entrepreneurs to participate in the first
place and to receive orders on storage and distribution of the mixture. Thus, we expect
the network to exhibit signs of heterophily leading to ties between entrepreneurs and
non-entrepreneurs.
Hypothesis 5: Entrepreneurs tend to associate with non-entrepreneurs.
Pre-existing ties
Pre-existing ties are legitimate or legal relations that were established between members
of criminal networks prior to the criminal activity itself. In the case of the methanol affair,
these ties take the form of kinship, prior friendship, being employees of the same firm, or
being legitimate business partners. There are two reasons why pre-existing ties has been
of interest among researchers of criminal networks for a long time. First, it has been
argued that pre-existing ties are a basis for interpersonal trust, which is deemed to be
crucial in criminal environment, where mistrust or untrustworthy partners may have fatal
consequences.45 Second, these ties represent the intertwining of the organised crime with
legitimate business and legitimate social relations.46 Smith and Papachristos47 even argue
that this overlap of pre-existing and criminal ties is a cornerstone of organised crime, as it
compensates for the lack of formal institutions and organisations, which warrant enforce-
ability of contracts and commitments in licit relations. While friendship or kinship may
anchor criminal cooperation in shared commitments and experience, preceding colla-
boration in legitimate business or other legal activities may be seen as a sign of credibility
and success of criminal collaboration. In this respect, social or physical settings in which
criminals may find information, resources or accomplices for their illicit activities, so-called
convergence settings, may facilitate or outright enable criminal organisation and
collaboration.48 Taken together, pre-existing ties have the potential to be translated into
criminal ties.
Research on multiplex social networks considers the co-occurrence of ties of different
types.49 The observation that multiple ties of different kind overlap (e. g., friendship and
mutual help) may be brought about by different mechanisms. We postulate
a mechanism of tie translation, that is, the tendency of actors to create operational
ties on the basis of pre-existing ties. The presence of a pre-existing tie may increase the
probability of the creation of an operational tie, but not the other way around. In this
way pre-existing ties increase interpersonal trust, reduce uncertainty and risk, and thus,
decrease the cost of creating operational ties. Embedding operational ties in pre-existing
ties does not only increase security, but it also adds to the efficiency by making such
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connections more ‘economic’. For this reason, we expect positive effect of tie translation
in the network under study.
Hypothesis 6: Actors tend to create operational ties on the basis of pre-existing ties.
Data collection and processing
This study relies on court files from three different courts which were judging the
studied case in the Czech Republic. Court files have been used in previous studies
yielding a valid representation of given network and providing a source data which
has been deemed valid.50 However, court files are not without their limits. A specific
weakness of summaries of court proceeding is the fact that offenders themselves are
interested in withholding as much information as possible in order to obtain the best
possible sentence. This yields systematically incomplete data, which may or may not be
uncovered by the investigation, court, or fellow offenders. Actors on the side of law
enforcement, however, focus on trying to prove the guilt of the offenders, and thus
scientifically interesting aspects, such as the evolution of offenders’ relations or their
individual qualities, may be omitted unless they are of specific importance for the court.
The data file was extracted from nineteen court records provided by the courts them-
selves, which together add up to more than one thousand pages of text. We performed all
the data coding manually identifying all actors associated with the case. For each actor, the
name was noted and their experience with legitimate business. All actors who were
reported to be involved in the affair (i.e., they knew they were collaborating in the distribu-
tion of illegal beverages) were included in the analysis. This yielded a total of 32 actors in the
network. All mentions of interactions and relations among any pair of actors were recorded
including the exact citation of the court file and a code for the content of that particular
relation/interaction. By far themost frequent codes were cooperation onmanufacturing the
illicit spirits, cooperation on their storage or transport, and supplying or demanding some
amount of the beverages. However, most of these codes were not distinguishable from one
another (e.g., whenever actors exchanged alcohol, it also always entailed some instructions
about logistics and planning). All the ties with these codes were eventually coded as
operational ties, as they serve the purpose of cooperating on the organisation of the
criminal activity. The only other type of ties that was distinguishable in the court files
were pre-existing ties. These ties mostly referred to friendship, kinship, legal business
partnership, or employment or cooperation within distilleries (convergence settings), in
which incriminated commodities were manufactured or stored. All the pre-existing ties
chronologically preceded the ties coded as operational. In sum, we analyse two undirected
networks – one of operational ties and one of pre-existing ties together with a binary nodal
attribute indicating entrepreneurship.
Methods
Cohesion measures are used in order to assess the properties of a network as a whole.51
Density is a proportion of ties present in the network relative to the maximum number of
possible ties in the network. Degree centralisation is the ratio of the dispersion of the
number of ties compared to a network with maximally concentrated ties.52 Closure was
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measured by the clustering coefficient, which is a ratio of complete (‘closed’) triangles to
all two-paths in the network, that is, to all triads connected only by two ties. All these
measures have a range from 0 to 1, where the closer the value is to 1, the denser (resp.
more centralised or closed) the network is. Density and centralisation can also be
expressed by average degree and the standard deviation of degrees respectively, which
are also directly interpretable from the actors’ perspective.53 The cohesion of a network
can also be expressed by the average geodesic (i.e., the shortest path length between
a given pair) and diameter (i.e., the longest geodesic in the entire network). The shorter
the geodesics and the diameter, the more cohesive the network. A descriptive measure of
observed homophily/heterophily is the E-I index,54 which ranges from −1 to 1, where −1
indicates that all ties are homophilous, whereas 1 indicates that all ties are heterophilous.
Geodesic distances are also important for characterising the importance of actors within
the flow in the network and the speed of flows in the network as a whole. We computed the
geodesic distances from the two actors who manufactured the poisonous beverages to all
other actors, which indicates how long distances the beverages had to travel in order to get
to each actor. For interpretation purposes, we computed the reciprocal of all these values,55
so that higher values indicate shorter distances, i.e., higher importance. We then averaged
these reciprocal distances to have an actor-level measure. The larger this number, the less
important the actor is as it takes more time until the batch of bottles reaches him/her. The
network-level characteristic derived from this measure (based on its average) indicates to
what extent the network is similar to an ideally structured one for distribution. As described
above, distances of all actors to the distributors in such an ideal network are equal to one. If
the observed reciprocal geodesic distances are divided by this number, the result indicates
how similar the observed network is to an ideally structured one where a value of one
means the observed network has the shortest possible geodesic distances from the man-
ufacturers to all the other actors. To capture the centrality of each actor in the network, we
computed their degree.
To disentangle effects of the micro-level mechanisms postulated in theory, it is neces-
sary to apply statistical models designed for network data. Standard tools of statistical
modelling and inference cannot be validly used for tie variables in networks for two
reasons. The first reason for not using standard statistics is the fact that the latter is based
on the underlying assumption of independence of observations. This assumption is
principally violated in networks (further see e.g., Borgatti and colleagues’ or Prell’s
textbook),56 because tie variables are interdependent. The second reason is the contrast
that, while standard statistical inference is oriented towards making inferences about
a population based on the knowledge of a sample drawn from it under certain conditions,
inference in networks is usually oriented towards making conclusions for a given data set
about its representation by a model.57 For both reasons, it is essential to apply network
models which were developed to address the interdependence among observations.58
An important class of models used to represent micro-level mechanisms in networks is
the exponential random graph model (ERGM).59 ERGMs model the interdependence of tie
variables with so-called configurations, which are basic building blocks of a network, for
instance, closed triads of mutually interconnected actors or pairs of actors with the same
value of a given attribute. The network structure is considered to be the result of accumula-
tion, overlap, and collision of these configurations. Configurations can be used to represent
theoretical local mechanisms and tendencies of actors to choose their ties, such as the
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tendency to cooperate in closed triads or to bridge openmicro-structures. The estimation of
the ERGM parameters determines which of these mechanisms were significant for the
formation of the network structure. This allows to consider several micro-social tendencies
at the same time and to disentangle their effect in the resulting network. Thesemodels have
already been used in studies of criminal networks.60 Moreover, by explaining macro-level
structures from their micro-level elements, ERGMs correspond with analytical sociology.
The dependent variables in ERGMs are the tie variables indicating the existence or
non-existence of the ties in the observed network. These are binary variables like in
logistic regression. The dependence between the tie variables is modelled by the
aforementioned configurations, which capture many different ways in which the ties
in the network may be dependent on each other. These configurations have a similar
role as the explanatory variables in logistic regression. ERGMs are both computationally
and conceptually considerably complex. Here, it is sufficient to say that first, the algo-
rithm tries to find a distribution of networks which on average matches the observed
frequencies of the configurations in the data. Based on the simulated distribution of
networks, the model determines which of the configurations is statistically significant to
explain the structure of the observed network. The output of the model is a list of
parameter values, which express the conditional log odds of the probability of creating
a tie in the observed network when, given the rest of the network, this tie would
increase the frequency of the corresponding configuration by one. If the resulting
parameter value is significant (in practice, at least twice as large as its standard error)
and positive (negative), then the corresponding configuration is present (absent) more
often than can be accounted for by the rest of the model. The configurations used to
model the network of the methanol affair are summarised in Table 1 The accuracy of
Table 1. ERGM specification.
Exponential random graph model specification
configuration visual representation interpretation
edges Tendency to create ties (model intercept).
alternating star Preferential attachment; H1 suggests negative effect.
alternating triangle Closure; H2 suggests positive effect.
alternating two-path Control configuration
alternating edge-triangle Brokerage (Pattison & Snijders, 2013); H3 suggests
negative effect.
attribute – activity generalised social selection; H4 suggests positive effect.
attribute – interaction Homophily; H5 suggests negative effect.
tie entrainment Tie translation; H6 suggests positive effect.
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estimates is judged by their t-ratios for convergence, which should be smaller than 0.1 in
absolute value to consider the model being converged.
After the estimation of the model, it is also important to assess its goodness of fit to
the data. In the ERGM framework, this is done by comparing the simulated distribution
of networks with the observed network in terms of network characteristics that were not
explicitly modelled, such as other configurations or global network properties.
Specifically, for each of a set of such characteristics, its mean frequency in the simulated
distribution is compared with its frequency in the observed network. If the absolute
value of this difference divided by the standard error of the distribution is not too high
(the usual cut-off is two), it can be said that the model has a reasonable fit to the data.
Results
Looking at Figure 1, it is apparent that the whole network is stitched together by the tie
between actors SPj and JV. Without this connection, the whole network would fall apart
into two mutually isolated components. Hence, it would be impossible to distribute the
poisonous spirits among all actors as it was manufactured by a pair of actors (RF and TK),
who both belong to the component around JV. According to the court files, JV had later
become the main distributor of these illegal and poisonous alcohol drinks. Concurrently,
JV started to cooperate with SPj, whom he knew from previous business activities and
they considered each other to be good business partners (a case of tie translation, see
Figure 2), thereby connecting both branches and getting the poisonous spirits to the
group around RB. This group was previously focused on profiting from tax evasions by
manufacturing untaxed spirits. Therefore, it appears that in this regard, the network
perspective collates with the conclusions from the investigation and court proceedings.
Figure 1. Sociogram of the network. Node size is based on degree. Colour of nodes represents
attributes (entrepreneur = blue). The left hand side corresponds to the Zlin branch, whereas the
right hand side corresponds to the Ostrava branch. The two diamond-shaped nodes in the Ostrava
branch are the manufacturers.
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Table 2 summarises the network descriptive measures. In total, there are 32 actors in
the network connected by 52 ties, which together yields a density of 0.11. Hence, 11% of
the theoretically possible ties are actually present in the network. While this number
may not seem very high, we see from the sociogram that it is sufficient to keep the
network connected in one component. Despite the fact that the network may appear
centralised in the visualisation, there are multiple high degree actors and the centralisa-
tion is only 0.27. This information is complemented by the average and standard
deviation of the degrees. On average, each actor has slightly more than three ties, but
the degrees show non-negligible variability, which means that there are highly central as
well as marginal actors in the network. Looking at the average geodesic path length and
the diameter, the distances between actors are quite long considering the number of
actors in the network. On average, information or resources flow between any pair of
actors through more than three ties, while the longest distance is six ‘steps’. The closure
is 0.28, meaning that a bit more than one fourth of all potential triangles are closed,
which means that the network is descriptively more open than closed. The value of the
E-I index is ‒.04 indicating neither homophily nor heterophily.
Table 2. whole network measures.
Whole network descriptive measures
statistic value
number of nodes 32




standard deviation of degree 2.51
closure 0.28
average geodesic path length 3.15
diameter 6
number of entrepreneurs 16
E-I index (entrepreneur) −0.04
Figure 2. Sociogram of pre-existing ties. The positions of nodes in the visualisation is based on their
position in Figure 1 for easy visual comparison.
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Table 3 displays the results of actor importance measures, capturing the top ten actors
with highest degree centrality and shortest distances to the two manufacturers. As it can
be seen, there is some overlap. The most prominent distributor JV and SPj have high
values of bothmeasures. An interesting fact is that while one of themanufacturers, RF, had
above average degree and the other manufacturer, TK, had below average degree, neither
of them was very central in the network. If they would have been more central, the speed
of distribution of the poisonous beverages and thus the lethality of the network would be
even higher. So while the distances from these two actors were short overall (2.8 on
average, maximum of 4), the structure could have been even more efficient with regards
to distribution of the lethal spirits. This is also reflected by the network-level measure,
average reciprocal geodesic distance to the manufactures, which is 0.59, suggesting that
the network reached 59% of its distributive potential. Other actors who combined con-
siderable degree with closeness to the manufacturers were MK andMP. Again, whenmore
actors would have had higher degrees and been in short distance to themanufactures, the
network could have been more effective with the distribution.
Table 4 shows the results of the ERGM. T-ratios of each modelled parameter were <
0.07 in absolute value indicating good model convergence and thus sufficient accuracy
of the estimates. A first conclusion is the remarkable lack of an effect of the two
configurations related to entrepreneurship. Thus, there is no evidence that the network
structure was systematically patterned by the experience of the actors in the sphere of
legitimate business, which is in contrast with Hypotheses 4 and 5. The parallel between
Table 3. actor importance measures.
Network and flow positions
actor degree actor distance
JV 11 RF source
RB 10 TK source
RM 6 JV 1
SPj 6 MK 1
TB 6 MZ2 0.75
MP 5 SPj 0.5
MK 5 MP 0.5
SPs 5 AJ 0.5
LK 4 DR 0.5
RF 4 MJ 0.5
Table 4. ERGM results. Statistically significant effects are bold.
Exponential random graph model results
configuration parameter S.E. t-ratio
structural effects
edges −1.240 1.256 −0.030
alternating star −1.060 0.493 −0.041
alternating triangle 0.726 0.310 −0.045
alternating two-path 0.080 0.073 −0.039
alternatin edge-triangle 0.003 0.092 −0.037
individual effects
entrepreneur – activity 0.829 0.575 −0.060
entrepreneur – homophily −0.689 0.693 −0.049
dyadic effects
pre-existing ties 1.654 0.414 0.013
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organised crime and legal organisations61 is not exhibited in this case. What does
significantly shape the network, however, is the presence of pre-existing ties. The
positive sign here indicates that a pre-existing tie between two actors increases the
probability of an operational tie. This supports Hypothesis 6 and also the results from
previous research.62 Further, two structural effects are significant; alternating star and
alternating triangle. Alternating star models the preferential attachment. A negative
value of this parameter suggests that actors in the network display the opposite
tendency, that is, they try to spread their ties evenly across alters in the network, as
with every tie actors have, the probability that they will create another one decreases, in
line with Hypothesis 1. The alternating triangle captures the tendency towards creating
closed micro-structures. This parameter is positive in the network, so there is evidence
for this tendency, which supports Hypothesis 2. If there is a triad of actors in the network
with two ties among them, the probability that they will create the remaining tie is
larger than if the two ties were not there. The alternating edge-triangle effect indicating
brokerage from closed regions is not significant, hence there is no evidence to support
Hypothesis 3. Overall, the formation of the network structure can be seen as the result of
the combined operation of the mechanisms of triadic closure, tendency against prefer-
ential attachment, and the translation of pre-existing ties into operational ties.
As for the goodness of fit, all of the 25 statistics representing configurations imple-
mented in MPNet show adequate fit of the model to the data (t-ratios < 1.2 in absolute
value for effects not included in the model and < 0.1 for those included in the model).
Additionally, Table 5 displays the goodness of fit of our model to the global properties of
the network which are implemented in the MPNet software package – standard devia-
tion of degree, skewness of degree and clustering coefficient. All the t-ratios are well
below 1 in absolute value, indicating reasonable fit of the model to these global
properties of the observed network.
We also re-analysed the two branches of the network separately to inspect whether
there are differences between the two branches in terms of ERGM results. However,
even though the models converged, none of the theoretically postulated effects were
significant and standard errors were considerably high due to the lack of statistical
power.63 This is not surprising, as these two sub-networks are smaller than the networks
usually considered to be well analysable by ERGMs.
Discussion and conclusion
This study revealed several findings from the analysis of the network of actors involved
in the methanol affair. First, the structure of the network was quite specific in that it
consisted of two components connected only through one bridging tie. At first sight, the
Table 5. Goodness of fit results.
Goodness of fit for global network properties
statistic observed simulated mean simulated SD t-ratio
standard deviation of degree 2.51 2.33 0.43 0.43
skewness of degree 1.48 1.25 0.56 0.41
clustering coefficient 0.28 0.28 0.05 0.07
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network does not show any obvious further structural features. That is, it is not remark-
ably dense nor sparse, heavily centralised nor decentralised, built on closed structures
nor it is in any other way compartmentalised. Although the two manufacturers were not
located particularly close to others, there are a few highly central actors in the network
and some of them are also close to the two actors who manufactured the poisonous
beverages. The ERGM results suggest that the structure of the network was brought
about by the mechanisms of closure, inverse preferential attachment, and translation of
pre-existing ties into operational ties. We also hypothesised a tendency to avoid broker-
age and heterophily with respect to being entrepreneurs, but found no support for this.
We demonstrated the utility of combining analytical sociology with statistical models
for social networks. Analytical sociology provides a theoretical framework for postulating
relational mechanisms as explanations for the observed network structure, which can in
turn be empirically tested with an appropriate statistical model for network data. Our
results show strong effect of pre-existing ties on the creation of operational ties. Besides
corresponding to extant theory,64 the effect of pre-existing ties may have policy implica-
tions, as investigators may use this finding in an investigation and track potential co-
offenders along the lines of already existing connections in legitimate spheres or
personal domain, such as friendship. To our knowledge, police investigators already
proceed this way frequently and thus our findings confirm the importance of such
procedures. Despite the strong theoretical foundation,65 brokerage, generalised social
selection, or heterophily with regards to entrepreneurship did not systematically shape
the network structure. In our view, this demonstrates the strength of our analytical
approach. As we could have interpreted the sociogram showing an instance of broker-
age (i.e., the bridging tie) or the prominence of entrepreneurs, these mechanisms tested
within a coherent framework against other competing explanations turned out to not
affect the network as much as it may seem upon first sight.
One mechanism worthy of further investigation might be propinquity.66 Propinquity
is a tendency to create ties based on physical/geographical proximity. Usually the closer
actors are to one another, the more likely it is that they will share a tie, as the shorter the
distance, the easier it is to create and maintain a tie. This mechanism is of obvious
explanatory importance for distribution networks as distribution unfolds in physical
space. The role of physical distances alongside network distances may bring new
insights into how the distribution network is structured.
Another avenue of research would be to consider the temporal dynamics of the
network. Criminal networks are adaptive and dynamic as actors involved respond to
their changing environment and the opportunities and threats it poses,67 which will be
manifested by the changes of the structure or change in actors’ attributes over time. The
question is then what relational mechanisms drive the evolution of the network68 and
how do actors respond in the face of critical turns of events such as law enforcement
crackdowns or the emergence of competing criminal groups.
However, neither propinquity, temporal dynamics, nor a more detailed distinction
between different types of ties (multiplexity) could be incorporated in this study due to
the lack of information in the court files that we used as a data source. Although there
are previous studies extracting even this fine-grained information from court files,69 the
level of available detail may vary across jurisdiction. It is possible that court documenta-
tion in some countries will lend itself to extracting more detailed information, while this
66 T. DIVIÁK ET AL.
may not be the case in other countries without reaching out to other sources of
information (e.g., police investigation files). Even though court files bear higher face
validity than data obtained, e.g., from media databases, data validity constitutes the
greatest limitation of the present study; this is the case in research on criminal networks
in general.70 Yet, we are confident that no crucial actor is omitted from the court files
and that all important connections were uncovered.
For the description of the network, we defined our own measure of actors’ impor-
tance as the geodesic distance from the two manufacturers. In general, the choice of
centrality measures for analysis should mirror the nature of the flow in the network.71
For our case, the flow of poisonous beverages was substantively important. The identi-
fication of central actors is obviously interesting for criminal network analysis and thus
the application of existing centrality measures or creation of new ones is likely to
proliferate. In order to use existing measures and derive new in principled way,
a common methodological framework for thinking about centrality measures may be
helpful. A potential framework for this is proposed in the so-called positional
approach.72 This approach provides a way of conceptualising network measures with
the aim to integrate the notion of position of an actor in a network (e.g., centrality) with
the notion of position of that actor in social space (e.g., socioeconomic status). This
opens the possibility to integrate centrality measures with the attributes of actors and
capture the prominence of actors in the network as based on multiple dimensions such
as centrality and skills or centrality in multiple different types of ties.73 Similarly, the
study of influential actors and outliers may be incorporated in the ERGM framework with
newly developed methods.74
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